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An analysis of the economic assumptions underlying fis-
cal plans FY 1981 - FY 1934 is described. The forecasts of
President Reagan's Economic Recovery Plan are compared to
the actual performance of the economy during the respective
period. The paper concludes that the supply-side economic
policies of President Reagan's plan were not adequately
tested by the fiscal experience. However, some oojectives
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March, 1931, the Coni^ressionai 3udget Office reporL-
ed that a combination of rapid inflation, hir^h unemployment,
lagging productivity, and record high interest rates had
battered the United States econo;ay in 1930. In response
to the poor economic performance. President Reagan present-
ed his economic recovery plan to Congress, Appendix A, on
February 13, 1931. In his address to Congress President
Reagan stated that by 1936 double digit inflation would be
cut in naif, the American economy would produce 13 million
new jobs, and tne gross national product would grow at an
annual rate of 4 to 5 percent. The President's plan con-
tained four key elements:
- Reduce the growth of federal expenditures.
- Reduce taxes.
- Deregulate certain industries.
- Establish and maintain a strict monetary policy
President Reagan's plan was theoretically based upon
a new wave of economic thinking called "Supply-Side
Economics". In general, the concepts postulated tnat
stimulation of the productive elements of cne economy
would increase productivity and capital investment,
thereby initiating an unprecendeted expansion of the
economy. Coupled witn a restrictive monetary policy,
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these supply-side policies were expected to reduce unem-
pioyment, reduce infl::tion, increase GMP ;rov;tn, snd
oaiance une oud^et simultaneously.
A. RESEARCH PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to address tne qu esc ion:
Have z'-Ae supply-side econc/nic policies of ciie Rea^^an admin-
istration besn adequately i:e3ted by the fiscal experience,
EY-1931 L.irou -h EY-19J'I? Tne forecasts of Rea.-^an's
econo.vilc recovery plan will oe coinpared lo zne actual
economic perfor.nance oi i:he respective years. Specific-
ally tnis paper will co.npare various econo..iic indicai^ors
and evaluate tne success or failure of Reai;an's policies
within a generally accepted ..lacroecononiic rnodei.
3. SCOPE Ai;D LIHITATiOiJS
Tne scope of analysis will be 1 i ia i t e d to an e x a , .i i n a -
cion of Lne eccno.r.ic policies of zlie Reagan administration
and oiie assu:.ipt ions
,
forecasts, and actual outco.nes of
the federal bud.-ets from FY-19c5l throu.gh FY-1934. A
s i ,; n 1 f i c a n t limitation with respect to tnis type of
analysis is tne question, vjiiat if President Carter r.ad
oecn reelected? Tne o u t c o la e s of the R e a • a n policies are
a i.iatter of record wnereas, the econo;;iic outco..ies of a
second Carter a a m i n i s t i" a t i o n can only o e estimated.
Additionally, zhe economy is a hu,^e and complex system
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chat does noc cnan_ie very quic/iiy. 'ine niOuienLU;,] of
economic activicy contin'jes for varying len:;ht5 of time
dependin,-; upon the ^cren^Lii and veiociuy of previous
policies. As a re::-j±L, the policies of the Carter
administration affected tne vaiuoo of economic indicators




Supply-side economics emerged as a r>ew school of econo-
mic uhought as a result of the performance of tne economy
in the mid 1970s. In 1975, unemployment was 8.5 percent
despite a federal deficit of 45 oillion dollars. Both
figures increased from tne 1974 levels of 5.6 percent
unemployment and a 6 billion dollar federal deficit.
According to conventional econo:nic theory this should not
happen because the existence of a large deficit should keep
unemployment low [Ref. 1:p. 31. Also, the simultaneous
occurence of economic stagnation and comparatively nigh
rates of inflation during the 1970s characterized the
United States as a stagflation economy [Ref. 2:p. 51.
Supply-side economics is more a cycle tnan an evolution in
economic thought oecause it is nothing more tnan classical
economics rediscovered [Ref. 1:p. 13. Bartlett [Ref. 1:p.
3] credits Irving Kristol as being the first to draw at-
tention to supply-side econor.iics. In an article titled,
"Toward a 'New' Economics?", iMay 9, 1977 edition of the
'/all Street Jour^nal, Kristoi wrote:
In response to this crisis in the theory of economic
policy a 'new' economics is beginning to emerge . . .
Its focus is on economic growth, rather tnan economic
equilibrium or disequilibrium, and it sees such growth
arising from a free response (e.g., investment, hard
work, etc.) to the economic incentives of a free market.
10
This 'new' economics is so-nethimes descrioed, ratner
cumoersomely , as 'supply-side fiscal policy'. . . It-
arises in opposition tothe Keynesian notion that an
increase in demand, oy itself, will increase supply and
therefore accelerate economic growth. The 'new' econo-
mics asserts tnat an increase in demand, where tne
natural incentives to .growth are stifled, will result
simply in inflation. it is only an increase in produc-
tivity, which converts latent into actual demand by
brin^^in^ commodities to market at prices people can
afford, that i^enerates economic growth.
Supply-side economics focus on the productive elements
of the economy such as the supply of labor, tne level of
saving, and the level of investment. Supply-siders tar-
geted these elemients oecause of the productivity problem.
Between 1950 and 1967 the average annual percentage in-
crease in productivity averaged 2.4 percent. From 1972
to 1977 tne increase averaged only 0.6 percent [Ref. 1:p.
5.]. Also, for tne first time in United States economic
history, tnere were tnree consecutive yearly declines in
productivity; 1973, 1979, and 1930 [Ref. 3:p. 124]. This
trend suggests the productive elements of the economy
required stimulation.
A. THE MACROSCONOMIC MODEL
Gross :Iational Product is an aggregate measure of the
goods and services produced oy a nation and depends upon
many factors. GilP may be measured by expenditure or oy
uses of income and is typically represented by the GNP
identity [Ref. 4:p. 14].
(1
.
) c + I + G + (X - M) = g:ip = C + S + T + R
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C represents c o n s u :.i
p
l i o n : I is i n v e s i: r,i e
n
l ; G is ,.; o v
-
ern'r.ient expenditures; X is exports; ii is itriports; 3 is
savin-,; T is taxes; and R is transfers of forei.^n natio-
nals, il i:,iinacin:5 tne forei-:;n coi.iponeni: of une GMP
identity v;ili si.npiify the inodei v.'itnout affecting its
purpose in tuis oaper. The new identity oecoines [.'.ef.
4:d. 35]:
( 2 . ) C -I- I -I- G = Y = C -r 3 + T
In equation 2, Y represents mcoi.ie. This simplified
identity is only a definition of GiJ? and says nothing
aoout tne oehavioral reiat ionsnips of the various components
Viewing the United States economy as a model will illustrate
various interrelationships am on 3, selected economic variaoies
This paper wii_ use tne macroeconomic ;iio iel dovci-oped oy
Teir-en [ Ref . 5: 0. 71.
1 . Consu.,-ipt ion
For si:..pi ic i ty , this paper v/ili define C as planned
expenditure oy individual nouseholds. Thus, consumption




Cq represents a minimum amount of consumption
regardless of exo;;enous factors. The term cYj represents
a component of comsumption tnat depends upon disposaole
income. The coefficient c is positive and Y^ , disposable
income, is definea oy equation:
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(n. ) ij = Y - T
Tnu3, consumption wiii increase with an increase
in disposabie incor.ie.
2. Investment
I n V e 3 1 in e n t, is represented by t n e equation:
(5.) I - Iq - vr
In Lnis model, r is tne only interesc rate and v
is znc iriar.'^inal efficiency oT capital. I^ represents an
independent level of investmenc. v is assumed lo be
greate:^ uhan zero buL carries a negative si:;n in tne
investment function. Therefore, tne higher the interest
rate Lhe lov;er tne level of investment.
3. Governmeni: Expendicure
In this model ,;;overnmenL expendi":ure is represented
by tne equation:
( 6 . ) G r G ••
The asterisk si.^nifies that government expenditure
is a fiscal tool and may vary. It is considered an i ii d e
-
p e n a e n t v a r i a o i e
.
4. Gross National Product
G;1P is defined as the sum.mauion of either side of
equation 2. Increases or decreases in any co.aponent of zYie
equation will affect GiiP accordingly.
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5. Si
Saving represents the amount of income left: over
after consumption and taxes are deducted. It is represented
by the equation:
( 7 . ) S = Y - C - T
Increasing the level of saving wiil increase GUP
.
This is a definition of saving in the macro model. 3enavi-
oraily, the level of saving is a function of income and
taxes and is represented by the equation:





The level of taxes in this model is composed of two
pans ana is represented by zhe equation:
(3. ) T = T-"^ + xY
The T^' represents that a portion of taxes are a
fiscal policy tool. in tne term xY, x is a positive number
and represents tne increase in tax revenue due to increases
in GM?. This represents the progressive tax structure of
tiie United States.
7. Tne Monetary Sector
The monetary sector of the model is represented
by three equations:
(9. ) M^ = Mq + KY - mr
(10.) M3 MS
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(11.) iij = M3
iIq 13 the a,iiount of .noney dernanded '.vithouc re.;ard
to income or tne rate of incerest. KY represents Lhat tne
dCiiiand lOr money will vary directiy with income or GfiP.
il. is tne supply of money and is equal to ii"^' v/hicn can be
chan2,ed oy tne .monetary authorities. M" is a monetary
policy cool. Equation 11 states an equ il ioriun condition,
mr represents the inverse reiationsnip between tne demand
for money and interest raues. The coefficient m is a
positive number but carries a negative si/:^n indicating that
as interest ra^es rise, the demana for money falis.
This model contains i:hree policy instruments whicn
can oe adjusted to influence Lhe economy. Fiscal authorities
can cnange government expendiLure (G'-O or the tax level
(T""'"). Monetary autnorities can change the supply of money
(.1-).
B. The I3-Li1 Model
W'itnin tne context of the m.acroeconomic modex, 13 and
LM curves, invest^nent-sa v ing and liquidity of money, provide
a more sopnist icated frameworx for an analysis of fiscal
and monetary policies [Ref. 5: p. 12/]. Tne IS cur-ve repre-
sents points of equilibriu;n in the goods market and is
derived from tne investment and saving functions. It
sho'ws combinations of inco.me and interest rates at whicn
desired investment and saving are equal. The LM curve,
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representing^ points of equilibrium in the financial
market, shows combinations of income and interest rates
at v;hich the demand for money equals the quantity of
money in the economy. The intersection of tne IS and LM
curves, Figure 1, defines the equilibrium point of interest
rates and income in the economy. In particular, IS-LM
analysis demonstrates the effects oi fiscal and monetary
policies on interest rates and the level of national
income [Ref. 6:p. 126],
1 . Multipliers
The relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary
policy depends upon tne slopes of tne IS and Li4 curves.
The multiplier effect of i^he respective policy tools de-
pends upon tne initial position of the economy [Ref. U:p.
94]. Changes in policy instru;:ients can oe combined in many
different ways to achieve a desired macro equilibrium. It
is important to realize that shifts in eitner the IS or LM
curves produce a multiplier which determines the cumulative
affect of fiscal or monetary policy changes.
3y assuming equilibrium in the investment and saving
sectors of the economy, tne macroeconomic ;,:odel defines a
tax cut or increased government expenditure as equivalent












The equilibrium interest rate and income are determmed simultane-
ously at the intersection of the tS and LM curves.
Pi-^ire 1 The Io-lW Cur-es.
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in fiscal policy may be defined by equation 12 where q
equals l/s, the multiplier associated witn tne mar,H,inal
propensity to save.
( 12. ) dY/d5 = q
Tnis indicates that the total impact of an expan-
sionary fiscal policy will be a multiple of the initial
amounL. As the IS curve shifts 1:0 the ri:^ht, the economy
moves along the LM curve. The increase in interest rates
will cause a reduction in investment demand. The net
effect depends upon the slopes of Lne IS and Lil curves
and the absolute snift of eii: ner or ooth curves as deter-
mined by the tnulr. ipl ier .
In the case of a change in monetary policy, an
increase in the money supply will shift Lne LM curve out.
This excess supply of money will reduce interest rates and
consequently stimulate investment demand. The ratio of the
increase in income due to tne rise in investi.ient is the
multiplier defined in equation 13 [r(ef. 4:p. 92]:
(13. ) dY/dl r b
The change in investment resulting from a arop in
interest rates is subject to a multiplier defined m
equation 14.
( 1U. ) dl/dr = c
13
Once again, the total impact of the monetary policy
change depends upon the slopes of tne IS and LM curves and
the actual shifts resulting from tne mul uipl iers
.
2. The Fail ure of Demand Mana^zement
As evidenced by tne fiscal experience of the late
I97O3, the demand management policies of the federal
government were unable to promote economic prosperity.
The traditional economic model, from v-;hich policies were
formulated, did not include some supply-side considerations
Inflation, productivity, wage rates, and tax rates were





Reducin^-^, inflation vjas one of tne oojectives identified
durin,5 President uea'^an's add re 3 5 1:0 Con ^r ess on Feoruary
Id, 1931. Fur ther.aore , tne President said infiacion had
reduced our prospects for econo.nic growth and attributed
the curi'ent ni^^h inflation 1:0 excessive ';^overnraent spending
and an overly accomoda
t
ive uionetary policy [Ref. Appendix
A]. The Reagan oian proposed specific decreases in budget
outlays and a restrictive monetary policy as a means to
reduce inflation.
1 . Govern:nent Spending and Inflation
In tne niacroeconoi.iic :nodel, government spending is
a fiscal tool tnat can sti..iulate the econo;:iy to full em-
ploy.nent equii ioriu;.i. If governuient spendin,^ is in
excess of tnat required to acnieve full employment, the
resulting stress on the economy can induce inflation
[Ref. 4: p. 174], Actual government spending ^aore than
d u 1 e d from 1974 to 1930, out, u n e r.i p 1 y r. e n t increased
from 5.5 to 7 percent, consideraoiy less tnan full employ-
ment. In response, President Reagan proposed a program
of budget restraint tnat vjoula reduce federal outlays as
a percent of GiiP from 23 percent in 1931 to 19.3 percent
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in 1934 [Ref. Appendix A]. Actual ojulays 33 a percent of
GUP from 1931 thou.^n 1934 ware 23.5, 24.5, 25.1 and 23.3
respsGLiveiy [Rcf. Appendix :3].
2. Monetary Policy and Inflation
The .nacroeconoinic inodei escaolishes the suppiy of
money as a policy tool Li^iat is controlled by monetary
autnorit.ie3 . In tne United States, tlie Federal Resevje
Board administers r.;onei:ary policy and funcuions somewhac
independently. Tne fed can change tne supply of money in
ways to support Lneir view of tne appropriate amount of
money witn respect to econo;,:ic conditions. This paper will
define uhe supply of aioney as Ml: tne sum of currency,
de;.iand deposits, travelers' chsci<:s, and otner checkable
deposits.
Excessive ,:5rowtn in tne money supply can induce
inflation. Excess demand resultin:; fro!:i increased invest-
ment will raise price levels [Ref. 4: p. 177 1. President
Rear^an's recovery plan desired a m.onetary policy chat
wouxd reduce the rate of money and credit ;^rowtn down zo
levels consistent with noninflationary expansion of the
economy [Ref. Appendix A].
HI grew at annual rates of 8.1 and 3.3 percent in
1977 and 1973. in 1979 and 1930, tne growth of Ml slowed
to 7.2 and 0.6 percent respectively [Ref. Appendix 3]. Tnis
change from increasin:'. to decreasing growth rates coincided
1
with the appointment of Paul Volc,-:er as Chair.r.an of trie
Federal Reserve Board. In 1979 the Fed had already es^ab-
iisned a restrictive inonetary policy as indicated by tne
;jrowtn in .11. Volxer restricted the ,Jrowth cf Ml by
increasing tne federal funds rate up to 15 percent and
tnen uo a peak of oyor 17 percent [Ref. 7:p. 66]. A
restrictive Monetary policy continued unrough 1931 with
an annual growth rate in Ml of 6.5 percent [Ref. Appendix
3]. In response to zae 19<31-19<j2 recession, i:ne Fed
eased .-nonetary policy in r.iid 1932 in an attempt to
stimulate a recovery. .11 grew at a rate of 3.3 percent
in 1932 and 9.3 percent in 1933 in support of a strong
econo;nic recovery. In 1934, Ml was reduced to a 5.3
annual percentage growth rate.
3 . The Inflation Rate
Assu:,iing a restrictive monetary policy and reduced
government expenditures as a percent of Gil?, the Reagan
plan forecast decreasing annual inflation rates for 1981
through 1934 at 11.3, 8.3, 6.2, and 5.5 percent [Ref.
Appendix B]. Actual disinflation, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index, occurred at a mucn faster rate despite
increases in government spending as a percent of GUP.
Actual inflation rates were d.9, 3.9, 3.3 and 4.0 percent.
This dramatic decline started from a rate of o\/er 12 percent
in 1930.
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4. The Phil lips Curve
During Preoident Carter ' 3 admin iotration, tne
traditional policies of de..iand ir.ana^ernenu failed to i^educe
inflation without causing widesoread unemployment. The
tradeoff betv^yeen inflation ot^ wages and unemployment was
illustrated by A.'./. Pnillips in what is now commonly known
as the "Phillips Curve," Figure 2. Phillips found that
Britisii ooservations from 1351 uo 1957 traced out a sinootn,
curved relationsnip between changes in money wages and
the unemployment rate [Ref. 5: p. 331]. In the late 1970s,
tne simultaneous high rates of inflation and unemploy,.ient
indicated tiiat the Phillips Curve nad shifted to a less
favoraole position wnere tne tradeoff was oetween a ni^her
rate of inflation and a higner rate of uneinpioyment .
5. Praise ana Criticism
Tne anti-inflation oojective of the Reagan plan ap-
pears to oe a dramatic success. Tne inflation ra was cut
in half by 1933, tnree years prior to tne forecasted
date. Aiso, Palmer [Ref. 3:p. 31-32] indicates that
aithougn the short-run costs of reduced inflation were
higher unemployment and slower econoaiic growth, tne
long-run oenefits seem to be per,nanent and not a refxection
of the downward swing of the ousi ness cycie.
Cri. tics of the Reagan plan argue that the use of
a restrictive monetary policy to cause a sharp disinflation
23




-Curve fitted to 1861-1913 dota
4 5
Unemployment 'percent!
Pig^are 2 The Phillips Cur- e
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'.N?as a disaster. They contend it reduced invest.nent , raised
deficiLS, and raised unemployment. Evidence concernin^^ the
real cost of disinflation is :nixed and not conclusive.
Fellner [Ref. 9:p. 13] concludes that wa,fe oenavior data
sugges'G a somewhat greater rate of disinflation per unit
of unemployment occurred from 1931 tnroui^h 1933. This
supports tne "Credibility Hypothesis" as descrioed by
iiordnaus [Ref. 10: p. 254].
Havin,-; a touuin :5uy in the V/hite House-perhaps encouraging
an even tougher guy at the Fed-causes inflation to de-
cline more quicKly and at less economic cost than it
would simply on the basis of the given path of unemploy-
ment and capacity utilization.
Contrary to Fellner, Summer's paper indicates that the cost
of disinflation as measured using wages or prices was not
reduced more rapidly as a result of the credibiliLy hypo-
tnesis The rapid disinflation was normal given tne severity
of tne recession and the snarp apprec iai-ion in excnange
rates of the dollar compared to major trading currencies
[Ref. 7: p. 1o5].
3 . Taxes
Reducing taxes was one of the four key ele;nent3 of
Ronald Reagan's economic recovery plan. Tnis oojective v/as
fundamentally based upon tne precept that high taxes had
seriously eroded incentives to work, save, and invest [Ref.
Appendix A]. The Reagan plan proposed an across the board
reduction of marginal tax rates for individuals oy 10
25
percent per year for three years starting July 1, 1931.
The plan aiso inclijcied a business tax cue by establisnin^
:<,er]erou3 depreciation allowances via zae Accelerated Cost
Recovery System. [Ref. Appendix A]. Accual personal
income tax rai:e reductions ultimately totaled 23 percent
vice the proposed 30 percent [Ref. 10: p. 93].
1 . Incentive to VJork
Tne supply of labor is one of the most basic ele-
ments of an economy and consLitutes one of the determinants
of productivity. 3y reducing personal tax rates 23 percent,
President Reagan noped lo reduce the i:ax disincentive to
work and affect an increase in the supply of laoor. Double
digit inflation of the late 19703 had increased individual
tax rates by pushing nominal incomes into higher tax
brackets. Tnis phenomenon, known as bracket creep, reduces
disposable income and effectively shifts a consumer's
preference towards more leisure and less work [Ref. 4
:
p.
129]. This result is illustrated in Figure 3. An increase
in the wage rate, due to a tax cut, will shift the ouaget
line from '.J^H to './-jH. As the oudget line shifts upward,
points of tangency are achieved on higner utility curves.
The dashed line, HH, connects the points of tangency
between the individual's utility curves and tne various
budget lines and represents the individual's labor-supply






Figure 3 The :Iork Leisure Decision.
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Although the civilian labor force participation rate
increased from 63.3 to 64.4 percent from 1930 to 1934,
chio rate shows a steadily increasing trend since 1966
[Ref. 11 :p. 294]. This trend is primarily the result of
increased female participation in Lhe labor force. From
1966, the labor force part icipaLion raze of women increased
from 40.3 percent to 52.9 percent in 1933. During the
same Lime period, Lne male labor force partici-
pation rate decreased from 30.7 percenu zo 76.4 percent
[Ref. 12:p. 24].
2 . The Supply of Labor
This paper will define the supply of labor as une
sum of people employed and those officially counted as
unemployed. After the final Reagan tax cut nad oeen imple-
mented in 1933, the total nuiaber of people employed had
risen by 1.6 million or 1.59 percent compared to the 1930
level [Ref. 12:p. 11]. Also, "uneip.ployment nad increased
by 2.5 percent or approximately 2.5 million people. Al-
though tne supply of labor increased by 4.1 million
people during the tax cul time per'iod, there is little
evidence directly crediting tne increase to the tax cuts.
Haveman [Ref. 10: p. 120] estimates that a "reasonable
oest guess" of tne labor -sup ply response to the Reagan
program would be on the order of 1.5 percent, approximately
1.5 million people. Tnis explains less than half of the
26
increase in the labor force. Haveman further qualifies
the esLiinates of his study by 3tatin>j, "Tiiese estiinaces,
it musL be Ginphasized are rough, and must be inter-preLed
witn caution." Very littie evidence was discovered
linking the increase in tne supply oT laoor to the Reagan
tax cuts.
3. Incentiv e lq Save
The Reagan tax cut v>;as also intended to increase
saving oy increasing nez income. As defined in equation
7A, saving is a function of income minus taxes. In addition,
a number of special incentives for saving, such as liberal-
ization of rCeogh plans, IRA's and "All-Savers Certificates,"
were established by Lne administration [Ref. Appendix A].
This was intended to reverse the trend oi declining saving
rates as a percentage of disposable income. This rate nad
declined from an average of ,'.3 percent from 1971 tnrough
1975 to an average of 5.2 percent from 1976 through 1930
[Ref. 1:p. 351. From 1931 through 1934, after the Reagan
tax cuts nad oeen implemented, tne average saving rate of
personal income increased to 5.37 percent [Ref. 13:p.
51]. On a yearly basis, this rate increased from 5.8
percent in 1930 to 6.6 percent in 1931. This was followed
by two consecutive yearly declines in the saving rate to
5.8 percent to 1932 and 5.0 percent in 1933- In 1984 the




The Reagan plan proposed an incentive to increase
investment in production and joo creation via faster depre-
ciation scnedules of new factories and production equipnieni.
[Ref. Appendix A]. This incentive vjas implernenLed in ^9S^
as the Accelerated Cost Recovery System. In general,
increases in tne level oi invesLmenu aid not occur as
expected. Figure 4 snows gross private domestic investment
declined from mid 1931 to the end of 1932. Tne decreases
in investment coincided with the 1931-1932 recession.
Although the Accelerated Cost Recovery System provided
a real incentive for businesses to increase investment,
other econouiic factors temporarily negated the incentives
of the system.
5. The Laffer Curve
Whereas President Carter oelieved a oalanced
budget was possible p r i rri a r i 1 y through fiscal restraint,
Ronald Reagan used supply-side economics to explain iiow the
budget would be balanced even witn his proposed tax cut.
Theoretically, tne rapid expansion of tne economy, initiated
by the tax cut, would ultimately increase tax receipts by
increasing the tax base. This was also part of Reagan's
objective of getting big government off the backs of tne
people.
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i^ire ^ Gross Private Domestic Investment
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A significant question vjith respect to tax revenue is
whetner tax rates vvere loo high. The Laffer Curve,
Figure 5, iiiustrates a Lheoreuical relationship between
tax rates and toi:ai tax revenue. Tne curve oehaves in a
manner sucii thai: there is an optimum tax rate at which tax
revenues vjili oe maximized. Beyond this point, as tne tax
rate increases, total tax revenue decreases. This area is
called the prohibitive region and illustrates tne limitation
of taxation as an ultimate fiscal tool. Historically,
there is no strong evidence to suggest tnat tne United
States tax structure nas ever been in the prohibitive
region on a macro level. Although tax cuts nave never oeen
self-financing within tne first year, the Kennedy tax cuts
reveaied tnat certain regions of a tax cut can be
self-f inane ing.
6 . Tne Kennedy Tax Cuts
The .H e a ;j a n tax cut of 1931 was remarkably similar
to the Kennedy tax cuts of 19o2 and 1964. 3otn plans
reduced tne personal income and corporate tax rates and
were criticized as being fiscally irresponsible. The
Kennedy tax cut averaged a twenty percent reduction in
every personal income tax bracket and was phased in over
a tnree year period. Additionally, the corporate tax rate







rigure 5 The Simple Laffer Curve
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Following cne enactment of tne Kennedy tax cut,
tne econoray experienced a .greater tnan nornial expansion
of real econoinic activity. A co:npari3on of economic activity
before 1961 and after enactment of the tax cut, 19o6,
indicates that unemployment declined from 6.7 percent to
3.3 percent and capacity utilizauion, as measured by the
Federal Reserve Board, increased from 77.3 percent to 91.9
perceni:. Also, during this period, real GMP grew at an
average annual rate of 5.9 percent [Ref. 14:p. 19]. It
should oe noted tnat from 1965 on, Sartlett [Ref. 1:p. 121]
discounts tne stimulative effects of the Kennedy tax cuts
due to excessive government spending and increases in the
quantity of money.
An examination of tne tax revenue data from this
time period reveals some interesting facts. As a result
of tne tax cuts, total tax revenue declined suggesting
tax rates were in tne norm.al range of tne Laffer Curve.
However, total tax revenue from individuals earning :nore
than 100,000 dollars actually increased, suggesting this
particular region of the tax structure had oeen in tne
prohibitive region on the Laffer Curve [Ref. 14:p. 20].
Although tne total revenue impact of a tax cut is
negative in tne snort-run, controversy exists as to
whether a tax cut is self-financing in the long-run.
Several studies indicate that the Kennedy tax cuts were
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indeed self-f inane in^^ as evidenced by the testimony of
./alter [leller before tne Joint EconoMic Co;n:.]iutee in
1977: "Did iL pay for itself in increased revenues? I
Lnink the evidence is very stron.i that it did."
C. Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve independently a
a
ministers inoneuary
policy in the United States. The Fed normally uses tnree
policy instruments to .djust tne supply of money; open-market
operations, the discount window, ana tne reserve ratio
[Ref. 4:p. 27^1. Eacn policy instrui.ient adjusts tne supply
of money through different market mechanisms and ultiiiiateiy
affect interest rates. As defined by equations 9 and 11,
the interest rates nave an inverse and direct relationsnip
to tne money suppiy. In addition, within the context of
the MacroeconoiHic model, only a single interest rate is
assumed to exist.
1
. Monetary Poljgy gnd Intgrg^t Rgt^s
Monetary policy and interest rates are significant
witn respect to economic :2;rowtn because tney affect tne
level of investment. This relationsnip is represented oy
equation 5. An overly restrictive i.ionetary policy will
produce lower leveis of invest;nent as a result of high
interest rates. This poses the question: Did the Fed's
monetary policy support President Reagan's economic recovery
plan? Three-Month Treasury Bill rates were forecasted m
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the Reagan plan co decline from 11.1 perceni: in 1981 to 7.0
percent in 1934. Actual races for 1981 tnrough 1984 uere
14.1, 10.7, 8.6, and 9.6 percent [Ref. Appendix B]. During
thai: tine period, the actual interest rate avera,2,ed more
tnan 2 percent higner than tnose forecasted.
2. Interest Rates and Investment
According to the Reagan doctrine of 1981, financial
markets would rally and an immediate plunge in interest races
would initiate the recovery cycle [Ref. 7:p. 25]. In
particular, capital investment was expected to be a major
factor contributing co the recovery due to the implementation
of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System.
The plufige in interest rates did not occur in
1981 as expected. In fact, long-term interest rates rose
from 9.6 percent in 1979 to an average of 14.7 percent, in
he first half of 1982 [Ref. 7:p. 1571. A significant
decline in interest rates did not occur until thie Fed eased
its i^estrictive monetary policy in 1982. Continued high
real rates of interest discouraged investment through 1981
and also made U.S. markets attractive to foreign investment.
This resulted in the increase in value of cne U.S. doiiar
relative to otner currencies and increased the unfavorable
affects upon investment of the steel and otner industries
already experiencing strong competition from international
markets ['der. 8:p. 71 ]
.
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One reason the Rea;:;an business tax cuts failed to
stimulate investment was tne five-percenc increase in
lon':;-terin interest: rates. This increase effectively ne:iated
the incentives of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System.
The introduction of ACRS provided an additional nine billion
dollars to corporations in FY 1932 and Vv'ould nave produced
more in the following years: 17 oil lion m 193 3 and 2 3
billion in 1934. Zvans [Ref. 7:p. 153] esti.nates that the
five percentage point increase in the iong-terin interest
rate was responsiole for decreasing investment by 25.5
oillion aollars. This estiinate is supported by the fact
that fixed business investment declined 17 billion dollars
from imolementa t ion of the tax cut tnrou ji early 1933
[Ref. 7:p. 157].
3. i'^onetarv Policy and Unemployment
i-lost econo;iiists will agree that a consequence of
a restrictive monetary policy is a hi-^her rate of un-
employment. V/ith the unem.ployment rate at 7.5 percent in
1931, the prospects oi a restrictive :.ionetary policy ..aade
tne issue politically sensitive. The Carter administration
had viewed unemploy:,ient as a top economic priority and
nad oeen very responsive in implementing programs to .ceep
unemployment as low as possible. The Reagan plan dismissed
the precept that a restrictive monetary policy would
increase unemployment oy maintaining that a rapid expansion
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of the economy ;-/ould occur and absorb any adverse effects.
In 19^1, instead of an economic boom, a recession occarrea
and unemployment reacned 9.7 percent in 19c32 [Ref. 3:p. 353]
D. Government Spenain^
Tne Reagan plan was especially critical of the "uncon-
trolled
'Z^Q'--^'^'-'^^^ of oOvernment spending [iJef. Appendix A].
Tne plan atLributed the hign sustained rate oi inflation
to an overly expansive fiscal policy and established
reductions in uhe growtn rate of government spending as a
central goal. The actual level of federal outlays from
1931 through 1934 support the success of the administration
in acnieving this goal. In 1930, government spending
increased by more tnan 17 percent from t.ie previous year
[Ref. 15:p. ;!-4]. Figure 6 illustrates the successive
yearly declines in the growth rate oi federal spending
during President Reagan's first term in Office.
Tne proposed shift in federal spending towara defense
and away from domestic programs was justified as a re-
assignment of budget priorities to reflect the true
responsibility of the Federal and State governments [Ref.
Appendix A]. Altnougn defense spending increased suo-
stantially, the actual level of proposed domestic oudget
cuts v/as less than planned. This is evidenced by the
fact tnat federal spending as a percent of GiJP was not










Figure 6 Growth Rate of the Federal 3udget.
39
1 . Tne Full-£:.nplov!-nent 3ud:et Concepz
A major poiicy conclusion of ^eynesian economics
is thaz expansive fiscal poiicy-in tne for;n of either
additional :^overnrri'3nt spending or a tax 'cut-is zne appro-
priate response to conditions of slack demand and unemploy-
ment [Ref. 6:p. 3?]. Tnis is represented in the niacroeco-
nomic model by equa'cions 6 and 8. The Rea;;^an plan proposed
tnat the tax cuts would offset the negative impact on
unemployment resulting from a reduction in u^overnment
spending via accelerated economic ^rowtn [Ref. Appendix
A]. In actuality, government spending continued to
increase at a decreasing rate while the proposed tax cuus
were imple:;]eni:ed . The plan had forecasted year±y declines
in the unemployment raze from 7.3 perceni, in 1931 to o.U
percent in 1934 [Ref. Appendix 3], Actual unem.ployment
rates for 1931 tnrougn 1934 averaged 7.5, 9.5, 9.5, and
7.4 percenr. respectively. A meaningful analysis of the
affect of tne Reagan tax cuts upon the unemployment rate
is nor, feasible due to the strong influence of the 1931-1932
recession.
2. Government Spending and GUP Growth
GNP growtn may be measured in a variety of ways.
Tnis paper will use yearly percentage change measured in
1972 dollars. This adjusted figure provides a measure of
the growth of real output tnrough time and is perhaps une
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single best .neasure of econc;nic per f or.Tiance . Tne long
range economic forecasts of GNP gr-owth in the federal
Dudgets fro;a 1931 tnrough 1934 r^n.^e from 3.7 to 5.6 percent
witn a i.iean value of 4.2 percent. These forecasts indicate
the optimistic attitude that the administration would
promote economic prosperity in the long-run.
The xReagan plan sought to reduce government spend-
ing primarily for two reasons. First, reduced spending
would (^educe deficits. Second, reduced spending would
reduce the ever-large share of economic resources being
consumed by the government [Ref. Appendix A], Tne plan
further oelieved that government spending had reached a
level where private spending was oeing displaced tnus
introducing inefficiencies into the econoiny. This result
is com.aonly l-:nov;n as the crowding out effect [Ref. 6: p.
35]. /.'ith respect to real Gi-JP growtn, the Reagan policy
of reducing government expenditure to stimulate economic
growtn cannot oe evaluated since government spending was
not reduced to the extent proposed. In addition, research
discovered no method or evidence to either verify or
reject this precept.
£. Deficits
Deficit reduction was a nigh priority in tne Reagan
economic recovery plan. It even forecasted decreasing
deficits from 54.5 billion dollars in 1931 to a budget
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surplus of 0.5 billion dollnrs in 1934 [Ref. Appendix A].
Actual Dudget deficits fro;n 1931 tnrough 19d4 totaled
almost 600 billion dollars [Ref. I6:p. 9.50], >/hy Ronald
Reai^an, one of one rr^ost conservative presidents in recent
history, would allow such lar,_T,e deficits to exist is an
eni~iTia. Although inany factors conLributed to the record
deficits, coinment on tne oud,-,et system will provide
meaningful background.
1 . Tne Fundamental Proolem
Tile fundamental problem of persistant deficits is
rooted in the pro-spending bias of legislative politics
[Ref. 17: p. 365]. This oias permeates the budget process
in several ways. First, members of Con.;re3s are motivated
by Lwo strong desires: to secure reelscoion by serving
their constituents and to develop a personal power base
in Congress. As a result, liiembers often propose additional
expenditures to benefit their const itu ients and form
political alliances with other members uo ensure tneir
proposals are passed. Second, expertise on budgetary
matuers is vested within oudget committees and suocom:ni ttee;
Consequently, the jurisdiction of these committees is
seldom challenged. The overall effect is an incremental
budget system that continually adds new programs and
seldom abolishes existing programs.
42
2. The Reagan DeficiL L5^;acv
Although tne United States has not carried a bud.^et
surplus since 1969, the Heagan deficit legacy is infa;nou3.
Once considered primarily a political probiera, huge budget
deficits are now recognized as a real economic problem
[Ref. 17:p. 43].
In 1931 the federal deficit was 73 billion dollars.
This ai.iount was not significantly greater tnan some of tne
deficits experienced auring the last half of tne 1970s.
In 1933 tne deficit increased to over 200 billion dollars.
This large increase in the deficit can be attributed
primarily to two factors. First, the proposed domestic
spending cuts were not achieved and thus tne increase in
the defense budget represented a real increase in government
spending. Second, the 1931-1932 recession caused the
Reagan ad:riinistrat ion to overestimate tax receipts and
underestimate domestic spending and the deficit. ''.Inereas
federal spending increased oy approximately 130 billion
dollars fro:.i 1931 to 1933, federal revenue increased by
only 1.2 oillion dollars and total tax receipts decreased
by 21 billion dollars [Hef. Appendix 3]. In 1934, the
6.8 percent GNP growth rate appears to have expanded tne
tax base since personal and corporate tax receipts increased
by 27 billion dollars [Ref. Appendix B]. Mevertneloss
,
the 1934 deficit totaled over 135 oillion dollars.
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As previously established, additional governrnenL
expenaitures will normally increase ZUP and decrease
uner.ipioyrnent . The large budget deficits experienced
during President Reagan's first term in Office question
the validity of his supply-side policies. Furthermore,
deficits of zaese magnitudes nave undenained the credioility
of supply-side policies with respect to GHP growth and
u n e . n p 1 o y m e n t
.
3. The Economic Significance of Large Deficits
The unprecedented 200 billion dollar a year deficit
level experienced during the Reagan administration pro;iipted
questions regarding their impact upon the economy. Gramlich
[Ref. 17: p. 43] proposes a convincing reason wny deficits
3 no uld be feared:
Deficits represent govern.,ient dissaving, and unless
offsei: by increases in private saving or capital imports
from abroad, deficits imply a lower proportion of output
devoted to capital formation. Tnis situation implies
reauced long-term growth in tne supply of capital, and
nence in fucure output and consumption levels.
Controversy exists as to wiiether deficits actually
represent a trade off between present and future consumption,
If deficits are offset by increased person ai saving or
capital imports, then tne economic iinpl ica tions of large
deficits are not so ominous.
4n
iV. CQMCLUSiOMS
In 1931 President Rea.-^an stated that, oy 1936 douole di.-^it
inflation would be cut in naif, une American economy would
produce 13 million new jobs, and G.NP would ^row at an
annual raze of U to 5 percent. In 1936, inflation is less
than 4 percent, the economy employs 9 million more people,
and GNP is estimated to be rifowing at 3n annual rate of 3.2
percent [Ref. I3:p. 11]. Furi:her;nore , the four key elements
of zhe Rea;5an plan were implemented. The .growth rate of
federal expenditures declined, taxes were reduced, some
industries were deregulated, and tiie Federal Reserve Board
has maintained a strict monetary policy. Despite the
apparent success of the Reagan plan, this paper concludes
that the supply-side policies of the Reagan administration
were not adequately tested oy tne fiscal experience rY-8l
through FY-34. This conclusion is oased upon the analysis
tnat tne improvements in tne economy were not achieved
through the supply-side market mocnanisms postulated oy
the Reagan administration.
Evaluation of tne success or failure of President
Reagan in promoting an economic recovery is difficult due
to the extant of presidential control over both fiscal and
monetary policy. President Reagan's control over fiscal
policy is somewhat limited. This results from tne fact
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that over half of zne federal budget is uncontrollable due
to entlLl ernent programs and other expenditure caLegories
deemed ..landatory. Final levels of federal expenditures
are deter.Tiined through policital interaction betvjeen Congress
and the Executive Office. VJiLh respect to monetary policy,
tne Federal Reserve Board administers policy independent
of the Executive Office.
In actuality, zi\e President possesses very little
aosolute po".;er with respect to tne budget process and
thei^efore must augment his power through political influence.
President Reagan has been extremely influential as evidenced
by the successful implementation of the elements of his
economic program and tne increases in defense spending.
Altnough the failure to achieve the desired domestic
budget cuts contriouted to record deficits. President
Reagan has succeeded in stonewalling most of the pressure
for tax increases.
Tne anti-inflation objective of the Reagan administration
is one of the tangible successes of the program. The
inflation rate declined, at a much more rapid rate tnan
anticipated and has reniained at or below 4 percent tnrough
1935 and into 1936. :laintaining such a policy is somewhat
politically unpopular since tne results are ofter manifested
in higher rates of unemployment and slower economic
growth. Tne success of the Reagan administration in
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reducing inflation underscores the ii.ioortance of the
federal government in ir.ana^infj tne economy at a iiiacro
level. liov\fever, exor,enou3 factors contriouted to the
apparent success of the Reagan plan in reducing inflation.
The severity ot tne 193l-19o2 recession and declining
world oil prices aided i-ne disinflationary trend.
Tne success of tne Reagan administration in reducing
federal expendit-ure is rnarginal. Although tne administration
did achieve the oDjective of reducing the groV';th rate of
government spending, total outlays, as a percent of GNP,
averaged almost tnree percent higher than those proposed
in 1931. This t r i r e e p e r- c e n t difference may o e a 1 1 r i o u t e
d
to two events. First, tne 19o1-1932 recession slowed GNP
growth. Secondly, proposed domestic Dud;et cuts were
not achieved and tnus represent a failure of fiscal
discipline. Consequently, the precept that reduced
government expenditure as a percentage of GUP would
contrioute to disinflation was not sufficiently tested oy
thefiscalexperience.
Attaininent of the objectives oT tne Reagan plan to
increase the incentives to work, save, and invest was not
evident from, the analysis of tne data. Increased incentives
were expected to result from a reduction in personal
income tax rates and introduction of the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System. Personal tax rate reductions ulti.nateiy
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totaled 23 percent and "were intended to increase savin.^
and work effort by increasing disposaoie income. Tne
3avin;-5 rate did show a modest increase of .67 percent
from 1931 to 1934. Even at 5.37 percent, tne rate was
far oeiow tne 7.3 pei'cent rate of the early 19703 and
demonstrated considerable fluctuation coinciding with the
1931-1932 recession. The labor force participation rate
also showed a inodesc increase of 0.6 percent fro;;i 1931 lo
1934 out cannot, oe credited to the Reagan plan. Tne
total labor force participation rate has demonstrated a
steady and increasing trend since 1966. In fact, from
1931 tnrou\iCi 1934, the male laoor force participation
rate declined slightly while the female rate continued to
increase. Tne overall increase in the total laoor force
participation is due to the increased entry of female
workers into tne labor market.
The increase in investment resulting from the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System failed to materialize. Gross private
domestic investment declined from mid 1931 to the end of
1932. Also, fixed business investment dec^^ined 17 billion
dollars from implementation of the system tnrougn ear^y
1983- It should be noted that the levels of saving and
investment are part icui^ar ily sensitive to economic fluc-
tuations and trends. Thus, the 1931-1932 recession
undoubtedly had a strong influence on these leveis and
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consequently under iiiinecl the anticipated affects of Presiaent
Reagan's supply-side policies.
The restrictive irionetary policies of tne Federai Reserve
Board, generally supportied by the Reagan" adiainistra oion
,
appear to have been overly resLrictive compared to the
optir.ial policy of Jioney and credit growch consistent vs/ith
noninflauionai^y expansion. Inuerest rates were constantly
higher than those proposed in tne Reagan plan of 1931.
This directly contriouued to souiewhat lower leveis of
investraeni: and slower econo.nic growth. As previously
noted, monetary policy is autonoiiiously administered by the
Federal Reserve Board. Therefore, evaluation of various
elements of the Reagan recovery plan must taxe into consi-
deration the existence of an independent and possioly
contradictory monetary poiicy. Furthermore, zae policies
of tne Federal Reserve Board have considerable influence
in incernat ional markets whicn tnis paper nas noL adaressed.
Finally, the i'eagan deficit i.e-acy nad undermined che
credibility of supply-side economic policies. ./as r.he
recovery frora the 1931-1932 recession a result of supply-side
policies or of an excessive fiscal stimulus waich _eft
deficits totaling 600 billion dollars from 1931 through
"1934? These deficits were well in excess of tnose normally
i n c u r r e d d u r i n ; J, p e r i o d s f r e c e s s i o n .
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The r e c o V e i^ y f r^ o ra the 19-11-1932 recession v; a 3 very
strong. Tne stagfl acionary trend of tne 19703 riad been
brolcen. Inflation remained oelow 4 percent while GiJP
growth reached 6.0 percent in 1934. However, the i-Tiprovement
in the economy was not achieved according to the Reagan
p±an. Tiius, this paper cannot conclude that the supply-side
policies were adequately tested by the fiscal experience.
Tl:is conclusion ini plies nothing regarding the validity of
supply-side economic policies; oniy that they were not
adequately tested witnin the scope of this paper.
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APPE.'JDTX A
PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
',7hite Hou3e Report (Edited)
F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8
1
I. A PROGRAi'i FOR ECOiJOMIC RECOVERY
Today the adrniniotrat ion is proposing a national recovery
plan t-o reverse Lhe deoiiitacin.g combination of sustained
inflation and economic dis'^ress which continues to face the
American economy. V.'ere v-;e to stay v;ith existing policies,
the resulu v;ould be readily predictable: a rising government
presence in uhe economy, more inflation, stagnating produc-
tivity, and higher unemployment. Indeed, there is reason
to fear that, if v;e remain on this course, our economy may
suffer even more calamitously.
The benefiu to the average American will be striking.
Inflation, wnicn is now at douole d^git rates, will oe cut:
in half oy 1936. Tne American econo-.iy wiIj. produce uhirLeen
million new jobs by 1936, nearly three million more than
if the status quo in govemD.enL policy were lo prevail.
The economy itself snouxd orea> out of its anemic growth
pattern to a much more robust growth trend of four ^r
five percent a year. These positive results will be
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accomplished simui taneou^ly with reducing tax burdens,
increasing private savings, and raising the living standards
of trie American families.
The plan consisus of four parts:
1) a suDstantial reduction in the grov;th of federal
expenditures
2) a significant: reduction m federal tax rates
3) prudent reiief of federal regulatory bui-dens
4) a monetary policy on the part of the independent
Federal Reserve System which is consistent witn
those pol ic ies
.
These four complementary policies form an integrated and
c o m p r e h e n s i V e p r o g r a m
.
The leading edge of our program is the comprehensive
reduction in tne rapid growtn of federax spending. Our
budget restraint is more tnan cosmetic changes in the
estimates of Federal expenditure.
Tne second eieraent of tnis program, wnich is equaxly
important and urgent, is the reduction in federal personal
income tax r'ates oy ten percent a year for tnree years in
a row. Closely related to this is an incentive to greater
investment in production and job creation via faster tax
write-offs of new factories and production equipment.
The third key element of our economic expansion program
is an ambitious reform of regulations that will reduce the
governmient-imposed barriers to investment, production, and
employment.
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The fourth aspect of this comprehensive 3Cono:nic program
is a monetary policy uo provide the financial environinent
consistenc with a steady return to sustained grov.'th and
price stability. Thus, a predictable and steady .growth in
the money supply at more modest levels than often experienced
in tne past will be a vital contribution to tne acriievement
of the econowiic ,ioals described in tnis report. -
11. THE TV;i?l PROBLSliS OF HIGH INFLATIOi: AMD STAGNAilT GROWTH
The policies this Administration is putting forward
for urgent consideration by the Congress are based on tne
fact that tnis nation novj faces its most serious set of
economiic problems since the 1930s. Inflation has grown
from one to one and a half percent a year in tne early
19oOs to about thirteen pei^cent in the past two years;
not since './orld VJar I have we nad two years of back-to-
back, double-digit inflation. At the same time, the rate
of economic growth has oeen slowing, and the unemployment
rate creeping upward. Productivity growth, tne most
important single measure of our ability to im.prove our
standard of living, has oeen declining steadily for more
than a decade. In the past three years, our productivity
actually fell
.
The most important .cause of our economic proolems has
been the government itseif. The Federal government, through
tax, spending, regulatory, and monetary policies, has
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sacraficed long-term growtn and price staoiiicy for
ephemeral, short-term goals. In oaruicuiar, excessive
govern:;ient spending and overly accommodative ..-.onetary
policies nave combinea to give us a climate of continuing
inflation. That inflation itself nas helped sap our
propects for growth.
The federal government has greatly contributed to the
persistence of nigli inflation. Overly stimulative fiscal
and monetai'y policies, on average, have financed excessive
spending and thus pushed prices upv^/ard. Since government
accommodation is widely expected to continue, inflation nas
oecome emoedded in tne economy. Productivity, popularly
measured as outpu t-per-worker-nour , is an indicator of the
efficiency of the economy and, consequently, of our abixity
to maintain the rate of improvement in our standard of
living. Over the past fifteen years, tne rate oi produc-
tivity improvement has slowed and now vii'tualiy halted.
Government policies have been a ;aajor contributor to
the slow down, but they can oe an even more important
contributor to tne cure. Tne weight of regulation and
the discouragement that results from hign marginal tax
burdens are xey factors, out inflation itseif also plays
an important role. Reduced capital formation is the most
important and visible but not the only channel by whicn
this occurs .
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The role of the tax syste.ii in reducing, our pajt ^^rovv/th
and its potential for iniprovin.; the prospects foi' future
growth deserves special attention. 3y reducing the
incentives for investment and innovation, both by indivi-
dual and by ousinesses, the uax system has oeen a key
cause of our stagnation. Restoring tne proper incentives
will marce a contribution to the long-run vitality of our
economy
.
The progress iv ity of che personal income tax system
levies rising Lax rates on addicions lo income chat
merely .keep pace with inflation. Households tnerefore
find that, even if their gross incomes rise with inflation,
their afuer-tax, real income declines. Some households
respond zo tnese nigher marginal uax uuraens by reducing
their work effort. "Bracket creep" also encourages
taxpayers to seek out tax snelters; sources of income
that- offer nigner after-tax returns but not necessarily
higher before-tax returns than more productive sources,
again contributing to econoriiic inefficiency. In the last
two decades, the congress nas reduced personal incom.e
taxes seven times. Mevertneless, average effective
tax rates are now about tnirty percent nigner tnan tneir
mid-1960s low. Marginal tax rates have climoed in tandem
v^/ith average rates.
III. SLOV/ING THE Gi^OMTW OF GOYSHNilSilT SPEHDIMG
The uncontrolled ;;rowtli of -;,overn;rient spending nas
been 3 primar'y cause of the sustained hi-gh rates of inflation
experienced dy the American economy. Pernaps of greater
importance, tne conuinued and apparently inexorable expansion
of government nas contributed to the widespread expectations
of persisting and possioly nij^her rates of infiation in tne
future
.
Thus, a central goal of the economic program is to
reduce tne rate at whicn government spending increases.
In viev; of zhe seriousness of the inflationary pressure
facing us, uhe proposed reductions in the federal budget
for the coming fiscal year are une largest ever proposed.
Tne spending reduction plan will shift federal budget
priorities, so Lhat federal resources are spent for purposes
that are truly tne respons ioil icy of tne national government.
Tne spending reductions will restrain federal invoi veaient
in areas cnat are properly left to state and local govern-
ments or to the private sector.
Carrying out this program of budget restraint will
also halt and begin to reverse the tendency of government
to take an ever-larger share of our econoiaic resources.
From a high of twenty-three percent of the gross national
product in fiscal 19d1, federal outlays are now scneduled
to decline to over twenty-one percent (21.8,j) in fiscal
1982 and to reacn approximately nineteen percent: oe .^inning
in 1934.
IV. REDUCING TAX iiURDEl.'S
An integral pare of the coraprenens ive economic prosram
is a set of tax proposals to i^.i prove the after tax, after
inflation rewards 1.0 wor^, savin_^3, and investment.
Inflation inevitably increases tne ourden of taxes on
individuals by pushing them into nigher and higner marginal
rates. In businesses, infiacion ..lakes tne purcnase of
new equipip.em: progressively more difficult by reducing
tne amount of cash flow availaole for capital inve3t:ment.
The tax package addresses botn of tnese problems.
As taxpayei^s move inco nigner bracicets, incentives to
work, save, and invest are reauced, since each addition to
income yields less after-taxes tnan before. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, Americans saved between seven to
nine percent of personal, disposable income. in 1979 and
1930, zae saving rate was between five lo six percent. The
combination of inflation and nig'aer i.iarginal tax races is
undouDtedly a major factor in tne lower personal saving rate.
To correct tnese problems and to improve tne after-tax
return fror.i work and from savings, tne President is asking
the congress to reduce the marginal tax rates for individuals
across the ooard oy ten percent per year lor the next tnree
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years, staring July 1, I98I. This would reduce rates to
stages from a range of fourteen to seventeen percent to a
range of ten to fifteen percent, effective January 1, 1984.
Since the late 1960s, the rate of net capital forma-
tion (excluding spending mandated to meet environmental
standards) has fallen substantially. For the five years
ending in 1979, increases in real-net business fixed
capital averaged just over two percent of the nation's
real-net national product, or one-half the rate for the
latter part of the 1960s.
As a consequence, the President is asking the congress
to provide for an accelerated cost-recovery system for
machinery and equipment and certain structures.
V. PROVIDING REGULATORY RELIEF
The rapid growth in federal regulations has retarded
economic growth and contributed to inflationary pressures.
V/hile there is widespread agreement on the legitimate role
of government in protecting the environment, promoting
health and safety, safegarding workers and consumers, and
guaranteeing equal opportunity, there is also growing
realization that excessive regulation is a very significant
factor in our current economic difficulties.
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yi. COilTROLLING MONEY AliD CREDIT
i-lonecary policy is zhe responsibility of the Federal
Reserve 3y3te:ii, an independeni^ a,],ency within the structure
of the i^overnment . The administrauion will do notnin:^ lo
undermine uhaL independence. At tne same time, Lao success
in reducin,^ inflation, increasing real income, and reducin,^
uneniploy.neni. will depend on effective interaction of
monetary policy wiun other aspects of economic policy.
To achieve tne goals of the adminiscrat ion ' s economic
pro3ra;:i, consistent: monetary policy must be applied. Thus,
it is expected that the rate of money and credit growth
will be brought down to levels consisuent with non-infla-
tion a r-y expansion of tne economy.
If monetary policy is too expansive, tnen inflation
during the years anead will continue to accelerate, and
the administration's economic program will oe undermined.
Inflationary psycnology will intensify. V/ages, prices,
and interest rates will reflect the oelief that inflation
and destructive effects of inflation will continue.
3y contrast, if monetary policy is unduly restrictive,
a different set of problems arise, unnecessarily aggravating
[Recession and unemployment. At times in tne past, abruptly
restrictive policies have prompted excessive reactions
toward short-term mioney ease. As a result, frequent policy
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cnaiT^es can send confusing signals, and the additional
uncertainty undermines long-terin inveot::ient decisions and
econo.nic i;rowth.
VII. A NEW BEGINNING FOR THE ECONOMY
Tnis nlan tor national recovery represents a
substantial breai< with past policy. The nev; policy is
based on the premise that tne poeple who make up tne
econor;iy--wori<er s , mana^iers, savers, investors, buyers and
3eilers--do not need tne government to ;:iake reasoned and
inteli ij2,ent decisions about how best to organize and run
their own lives. Fney continually adapt to oest fit tne
current environment. Tne most appropriate role for
government economic policy is to provide a stable and
unfettered environ^nent in which the private individual can
confidently plan and make appropriate decisions. Tne new
recovery plan is designed to oring all aspects of govern-
ment policy a greater sense of purpose and consistency.
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TABLES FROM .jHITE HOUSE REPORT
Feoruary 13, 19^1
SHIFT IN BUDGET PRIORITIES
1962 1931 19d4













6.9 64.3 66 . 3
26.9 193.2 142.0
106.3 Q54.7 771.6
43.3 24. 1 32.4
24.6 96.6 40.6
6.4 9.3 8.6
27.2 29. ^7 18.4
100.0 100.0 100.0










FEDERAL REVENUE A;:D OUTLAYS
(IN BILLION OF DOLLARS)
D eficit(-)or
Fiscal y ear Revenues Outlays Surplus (+)
1981 600.2 654.7 -54.5
1932 650.5 695.5 -54.0
1983 710.1 733.1 -23.0
1984 772.1 771.6 + 0.D
1985 851.0 844.0 -i-7.0
1936 942. 1 912.1 + 30.0
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A PPEMDIX 3
VARIOUS ECOMOMIC IIJDICATOR TABLES





Source: Sud.-ret of one United States Government Fiscal Year
1936, p. 9.53.



















Source: Economic indicators, July 1935, Council of Econo:nic
Advisers.
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ECOHOMIC ASSUM?TIO;JS AiiD ACTUAL OUTCOMES
Economic Variable 1931 1982 1983 1984
Real GUP (1972 dollaro)
AdGinistrat ion 1.1
Actual 2.5










Bills { ,j annual averaj^e)






9.9 8.3 l.o 6.0
9.5 6.0 3.8 3.8
1 . 1 8.3 6.2 5 . D
8.9 3.9 3.8 4.0
7.3 7.2 6 .
6
6.4







SOURCES: Executive Office of tiie President, Office of
Management and Budget; Congressional Budget
Office; Council of Economic Advisers, Economic
Indicators, Juiy 19 35.
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FEDERAL OUTLAYS PERCENT YEARLY CHAIIG^









SOURCE: 3UDGET OF THE UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR
193o






297.7 ^^ - 49.2
233.9 37.0
295.2 55.9
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL
















SOURCE: HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
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